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1 Introduction
Extensive empirical evidence suggests that producers engaged in international trade often
set prices in the currency of buyers, i.e. they engage in local currency pricing (LCP).1 This
has prompted a lively literature examining optimal exchange rate and monetary policy in
the context of LCP. This literature has, almost without exception, focused on models where
the underlying source of uncertainty is shocks to productivity (or labour supply). This
implies that exchange rate movements have a potentially beneficial role in directing consumer
demand towards the country experiencing a positive productivity shock and away from the
country experiencing low productivity. The expenditure switching role of exchange rates is
therefore potentially welfare enhancing. The main point of debate in this literature is whether
LCP, by breaking the short-term link between the nominal exchange rate and the prices
faced by buyers, undermines the expenditure switching role of exchange rate movements and
thus removes one of the benefits of exchange rate flexibility. Devereux and Engel (2003) in
particular argue that, in the LCP case (where the exchange rate has no expenditure switching
role), a fixed exchange rate is beneficial because it enhances consumption risk sharing.2
An alternative view of the exchange rate policy problem is that monetary or financial
market shocks are an important source of movements in exchange rates. Such exchange rate
movements, far from reallocating demand optimally, will in fact be the cause of misallocations
of demand. In other words, in this view, the exchange rate is a shock transmitter rather than
a shock absorber. The expenditure switching eﬀect in this case is a source of sub-optimal
volatility in output and consumption. The idea that exchange rates are often substantially
misaligned relative to real fundamentals is indeed a staple of the policy debate. The wide
fluctuations in the value of the major currencies in the post Bretton Woods period have given
1See, for instance, Engel (1999) and Atkeson and Burstein (2008), for discussion of empirical evidence.
2Devereux and Engel (2003) show that in the presence of LCP, exchange rate movements cause changes
in the real exchange rate which undermine eﬃcient consumption risk sharing. It is therefore optimal to
stabilise the nominal exchange rate. There has been a number of counter-arguments to this point of view.
For instance, Obstfeld (2002) shows that LCP in trade in final goods does not prevent expenditure switching
as long as there is producer currency pricing (PCP) at the intermediate goods level, so a floating exchange
rate is still better than a fixed rate. Duarte and Obstfeld (2008) show that even in the presence of LCP,
exchange rate flexibility is necessary for optimal risk sharing even when there are non-traded consumption
goods. In a more general model, Devereux and Engel (2007) show that optimal exchange rate flexibility
depends on the trade-oﬀ between expenditure switching and risk sharing. Corsetti and Pesenti (2005), Engel
(2009) and Sutherland (2005) present further analyses of optimal monetary policy in LCP models. Engel
(2009) and Sutherland (2005) show that exchange rate variability is a potentially important factor in optimal
monetary policy in certain circumstances.
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rise to frequent calls for intervention to stabilise exchange rates. It is clear that there is a
widespread view that fluctuations in nominal exchange rates of the magnitude of +/-50% in
the space of a few years (as has been the case for the US dollar) are unlikely to be driven
exclusively by optimal responses to relative productivity movements.
Clearly, by aﬀecting the link between the nominal exchange rate and relative prices,
LCP may have important implications for the way in which monetary and financial market
shocks generate expenditure switching. This in turn may have a significant impact on the
welfare performance of alternative exchange rate and monetary policy regimes. By focusing
on productivity shocks, the current literature on LCP has largely overlooked this connection
between monetary shocks, LCP and exchange rate regime choice. In this paper we aim to
address this potentially important shortcoming of the current literature. We analyse the
implications of LCP for monetary policy in an economy which faces exchange rate volatility
arising from monetary shocks in a foreign country. The analysis focuses on optimal monetary
policy for the home country in the face of these foreign monetary shocks. In our analysis,
expenditure switching is potentially welfare reducing. This is in direct contrast to the De-
vereux and Engel (2003) analysis, which analyses the impact of LCP on regime choice in a
world where expenditure switching may be welfare enhancing.
We analyse four possible combinations of producer currency pricing (or PCP, where
producers set prices in their own currency) and LCP in a two-country model. There are two
symmetric cases. One with both home and foreign producers following PCP (Case 1, in our
analysis below). And one with both home and foreign producers following LCP (Case 2).
There are also two asymmetric cases. One with home producers following PCP and foreign
producers following LCP (Case 3). And one with home producers following LCP and foreign
producers following PCP (Case 4).
In Case 1, where producers in both countries follow PCP, we show that the exchange
rate volatility caused by foreign monetary shocks causes sub-optimal volatility in home-
country output.3 This creates an incentive for the home country to dampen movements in
the exchange rate. However, in Case 2, where there is complete and symmetric LCP, we find
that the expenditure switching eﬀect is absent. This implies that exchange rate movements
play no part in transmitting foreign monetary shocks to the home country. The incentive
to stabilise the exchange rate is correspondingly reduced. In this case, floating rate regimes
are shown to be welfare superior to a fixed exchange rate. Notice that the presence of LCP
in this case has an eﬀect which is exactly opposite to that in the Devereux and Engel (2003)
3A detailed analysis of this case is presented in Senay and Sutherland (2007a).
2
analysis, where LCP creates an incentive for exchange rate stabilisation.
These results are based on a case where producers in both countries follow local currency
pricing.4 The conclusions are somewhat diﬀerent, however, if LCP is asymmetric. In Case 3,
where home country producers adopt PCP while foreign producers adopt LCP, we find that
the case for exchange rate flexibility is strengthened relative to the symmetric PCP case.
But in the opposite case (Case 4), where home producers follow LCP and foreign producers
follow PCP, the case for exchange rate stabilisation is strengthened. In fact, in this second
asymmetric case, it is shown that a fixed rate can out-perform floating rate regimes in welfare
terms.
It is shown therefore that LCP, when it arises in the particular asymmetric way repre-
sented by Case 4, can strengthen the argument for a fixed exchange rate. But the underlying
reasons diﬀer from those emphasised by Devereux and Engel (2003). It is the continued pres-
ence of expenditure switching in our Case 4 which is important, while in Devereux and Engel
(2003) it is the absence of expenditure switching which creates the argument for exchange
rate stabilisation.
The two asymmetric cases are particularly interesting because, for many countries, it is
natural for both exports and imports to be priced in a reference currency, such as the US
dollar. For instance, Tavlas (1997), Bekx (1998) and Goldberg and Tille (2008a) provide
extensive evidence on the use of the US dollar as the currency most used for invoicing in
international trade. Case 4 corresponds to a world where the foreign currency is a reference
currency (e.g. the US dollar). So the policy problem analysed can be interpreted as the
choice faced by countries (other than the USA) in a world where trade is priced in US
dollars and where US monetary shocks cause fluctuations in the value of the dollar. The
conclusion is that such countries can benefit by stabilising (or even fixing) the value of their
home currency against the dollar. This indeed corresponds to the monetary policy actually
adopted by a wide range of emerging market countries. The first asymmetric case (Case
3) corresponds to a world where the home currency is a reference currency, while monetary
shocks are occurring in a non-reference currency. The unsurprising conclusion, in this case,
is that exchange rate flexibility is a useful way for the home country to insulate itself from
foreign monetary shocks.5
4Our result for the symmetric LCP case closely resembles one of the cases considered by Bacchetta and
van Wincoop (2000). Unlike much of the literature on monetary policy and LCP, Bacchetta and van Wincoop
consider monetary shocks and in a potentially asymmetric policy analysis. They show that an asymmetric
peg is inferior to a floating exchange rate. But, unlike this paper, they do not analyse asymmetric LCP.
5A further interesting question is prompted by our analysis. If firms could freely choose the currency
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Devereux et al (2007) analyse optimal monetary policy in a world with a reference cur-
rency (i.e. a world with asymmetric LCP/PCP). They find that the reference currency
country is indiﬀerent to exchange rate volatility while non-reference currency countries place
a high weight on exchange rate volatility in welfare. They focus on a Nash equilibrium in
monetary policy setting and show that the reference currency country suﬀers a welfare loss
from the reference status of its currency. Goldberg and Tille (2008b) also analyse monetary
policy in a world with a reference currency. As with much of the other literature on LCP, and
in contrast to the analysis presented in this paper, these authors focus on optimal monetary
policy in the face of productivity shocks.
The model we use is very standard. The main diﬀerence compared to others is the
focus on monetary shocks. In itself, as a general proposition, it is not surprising that policy
prescriptions change when the source of shocks changes. This is a well-known theoretical
result. Our contribution is to analyse in detail how this works out in a standard model
which has been widely used in the current literature. The simplicity of the model allows us
to identify the specific transmission mechanisms of monetary shocks and show and describe
intuitively how optimal policy depends on these mechanisms and the currency of price setting.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the details of the model, Section 3
describes and discusses the links between monetary policy and welfare, Section 4 presents
the main discussion of alternative monetary policy regimes in the four cases outlined above,
and Section 5 concludes.
in which to price goods, would the equilibrium display LCP in the home country and PCP in the foreign
county, or vice versa? This paper does not consider this question explicitly, but Devereux, Engel and
Storgaard (2004) oﬀer some useful indicators of the likely conclusion. They show that the currency with the
lowest variance of monetary shocks is likely to be chosen as the reference currency. In other words, in the
model of the current paper, the home currency will be chosen as the reference currency. And thus exchange
rate flexibility will be beneficial to the home country. However, there are other factors, not modelled by
Devereux, Engel and Storgaard, which aﬀect the choice of reference currency. The US dollar is clearly
a major reference currency because of the size of the US economy and the liquidity and eﬃciency of US
monetary and financial markets, and not because of the low variance of monetary shocks in the USA. The
size and liquidity of the US monetary sector is thus likely to outweigh other factors in the choice of reference
currency for small emerging market countries. Therefore, the case where home producers follow LCP and
foreign producers follow PCP (our Case 4), with monetary shocks occurring in the foreign country, is likely
to be relevant for many emerging market economies, despite the Devereux, Engel and Storgaard (2004)
prediction.
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2 The Model
We use a variant of the benchmark sticky-price general equilibrium model that follows the
framework developed by Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995, 2002). The analysis focuses on the
impact of foreign monetary shocks, which are the only source of stochastic shocks in the
model. Four possible regimes for the home monetary authority considered.
The world consists of two equal-sized countries, the home country and the foreign country,
and exists for only one period. Each country is populated by a unit mass of agents, with
home agents indexed h ∈ [0, 1] and foreign agents indexed f ∈ [0, 1]. The consumption basket
is identical for all home and foreign agents and consists of all home and foreign produced
goods. Each agent is a monopoly producer of a single diﬀerentiated product. All agents set
prices before shocks occur and are contracted to meet demand at these pre-set prices. We
consider both producer currency pricing (PCP) and local currency pricing (LCP).
The detailed structure of the home country is described below. The foreign country has
an identical structure. Where appropriate, foreign real variables and foreign currency prices
are indicated with an asterisk.
2.1 Preferences
The utility of representative home agent h is
U (h) = E
½
logC (h) + χ log
M (h)
P
− K
2
£
y2H (h) + y
∗2
H (h)
¤¾
(1)
where χ and K are positive constants, C is a consumption index defined across all home and
foreign goods, M denotes end-of-period nominal money holdings, P is the consumer price
index, yH (h) is the output of good h for sale in the home country and y∗H (h) is the output
of good h for sale in the foreign country and E is the expectations operator.6
The consumption index C for home agents is
C =
"µ
1
2
¶ 1
θ
C
θ−1
θ
H +
µ
1
2
¶ 1
θ
C
θ−1
θ
F
# θ
θ−1
(2)
where CH and CF are Dixit-Stiglitz indices of home and foreign produced goods with elas-
ticity between individual goods denoted φ, where φ > 1. The parameter θ is the elasticity
6Utility is assumed to be additively separable in yH (h) and y∗H (h). This greatly simplifies the algebra
and provides a very simple and intuitive set of results. An alternative model, with non-additively separable
utility in yH (h) and y∗H (h) , delivers qualitatively the same conclusions but at the cost of greater complexity.
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of substitution between home and foreign goods. In many papers in the related literature,
this parameter is assumed to be unity. It will become apparent below that θ plays an key
role in determining the strength of the expenditure switching eﬀect and thus has important
implications for the welfare ranking of monetary policy regimes.
The budget constraint of agent h is
M(h) =M0 + pH (h) yH(h) + Sp∗H (h) y
∗
H(h)− PC(h)− T + PR(h) (3)
where M0 and M(h) are initial and final money holdings, T is a lump-sum government
transfer, pH (h) is the price of home good h for sale in the home market, p∗H (h) is the foreign
currency price of home good h for sale in the foreign market, S is the nominal exchange rate
(expressed as the home currency price of foreign currency) and R(h) is the income from a
portfolio of state contingent assets (to be described in more detail below in sub-section 2.3).
The government’s budget constraint is: M −M0 + T = 0. Changes in the money supply
are assumed to enter and leave the economy via changes in lump-sum transfers.
The aggregate consumer price index for home agents is
P =
∙
1
2
P 1−θH +
1
2
P 1−θF
¸ 1
1−θ
(4)
where PH and PF are the price indices for home and foreign goods respectively.
Given the utility function and budget constraint just described, optimal home demands
for home and foreign goods are
CH =
1
2
C
µ
PH
P
¶−θ
, CF =
1
2
C
µ
PF
P
¶−θ
(5)
The demand for home and foreign goods by foreign agents has an identical structure to the
home demands. The total population of each country is normalised to unity. The total
demands for goods are therefore equivalent to individual demands.
The aggregate output of home goods for sale in the home and foreign countries are
respectively YH and Y ∗H and the corresponding outputs for the foreign country are YF and
Y ∗F . In equilibrium it follows that YH = CH , YF = CF , Y ∗H = C∗H and Y ∗F = C∗F where C∗H
and C∗F are foreign country demands for home and foreign goods.
2.2 Price Setting
Agents set the prices of their output in advance of the realisation of shocks. The first-order
conditions for price setting diﬀer depending on whether producers engage in PCP or LCP.7
7We assume home and foreign goods markets are segmented (in the sense that separate prices can be set
in home and foreign markets for all goods) in both PCP and LCP cases. Notice that the law of one price,
6
When home producers follow PCP (i.e. set prices in their own currency), the first-order
condition for price setting imply
PH =
φ
φ− 1
KE [Y 2H ]
E [YH/(PC)]
, P ∗H =
φ
φ− 1
KE [Y ∗2H ]
E [Y ∗H/(PC)]S
(6)
where PH is the price of home goods for sale to home agents and P ∗H is the price of home
goods for sale to foreign agents (expressed in foreign currency). These expressions indicate
that a form of risk premium arises in goods prices because agents face uncertainty over the
level of work eﬀort.
When home producers engage in LCP the first-order conditions for home and foreign
prices are as follows
PH =
φ
φ− 1
KE [Y 2H ]
E [YH/(PC)]
, P ∗H =
φ
φ− 1
KE [Y ∗2H ]
E [SY ∗H/(PC)]
(7)
Note that the only diﬀerence between (7) and (6) is the way the exchange rate enters in
the expression for P ∗H . In the PCP case, producers set the price of the home good in the
foreign market in terms of home currency. The nominal exchange rate aﬀects the foreign
currency price, P ∗H , after the monetary shock is realised, so prices exhibit full exchange rate
pass-through. In the LCP case home producers set the price of the home good in the foreign
market in foreign currency before the monetary shock is realised and the exchange rate is
determined. It is thus only expectations of the exchange rate which enter the expression for
P ∗H in (7). The actual realisation of the exchange rate has no impact on P ∗H , so there is no
exchange rate pass-through.
Similar expressions can be derived for the prices of foreign goods, PF and P ∗F in the PCP
and LCP cases.
One of the monetary policy rules considered below is a regime which targets a measure of
producer prices for the home economy. We define this producer price measure to be the price
of home goods for sale in the home country, PH . Because, in this model, all goods prices are
pre-set (and thus do not vary in response to shocks), the ‘price-targeting’ regime is modelled
in terms of the price level that producers would choose in a flexible price environment.
This price level, denoted P VH (where the superscript ‘V ’ indicates that this is a ‘virtual’ or
‘notional’ price level) is given by the expression for PH in (6) (or (7)) after removing the
expectations operators from the right hand side, i.e.
P VH =
φ
(φ− 1)KYHPC (8)
and thus purchasing power parity, does not hold even in the PCP case.
7
Price targeting is defined in terms of a target level for P VH .
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2.3 Financial Markets and Risk Sharing
When, as in the current model, shocks are asymmetric and the focus of interest is the policy
choice and welfare of a single country, it is necessary explicitly to consider how policy choices
aﬀect asset prices and portfolio decisions. We assume that financial markets are suﬃciently
sophisticated to allow full sharing of consumption risks. This is achieved by assuming that
trade takes place in equity shares in each country’s real income. Thus a unit of the “home
equity” pays a return proportional to y where
y = (YHPH/S + Y ∗HP
∗
H)/P
∗
and a unit of the “foreign equity” pays a return proportional to y∗ where
y∗ = (YFPF/S + Y ∗FP
∗
F )/P
∗
The portfolio returns for home and foreign agents are thus
R (h) = ζH (h) (y − qH)Q+ ζF (h) (y∗ − qF )Q (9)
R∗ (f) = ζ∗H (f) (y − qH) + ζ∗F (f) (y∗ − qF ) (10)
where ζH (h) and ζF (h) are holdings of home agent h of the home and foreign equities,
ζ∗H (f) and ζ
∗
F (f) are the holdings of foreign agent f of home and foreign equities, qH and
qF are the unit prices of the home and foreign equities and Q = P ∗S/P is the real exchange
rate.
It is important to note that (following Devereux and Engel, 2003), the payoﬀs from assets
are assumed to be transferred between countries in terms of money. Transfers in terms of
goods are ruled out. This implies that the equilibrium in asset markets does not ensure
fully eﬃcient risk sharing in the case of LCP. This is because households in the two countries
value the portfolio payoﬀs in terms of the goods prices they face in their respective countries.
In the LCP case, the law of one price does not hold so there will be distortions in relative
valuations of the portfolio payoﬀ across the two countries.
8Sutherland (2006) analyses monetary policy in a model where the population of producers is divided into
flexible-price and fixed-price producers. The structure in the current paper can be interpreted as a limiting
case where the proportion of flexible-price producers in such a framework tends to zero.
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Asset trade is assumed to take place after the choice of policy regime. Agents can
therefore insure themselves against the risk implied by a particular policy regime, but they
can not insure themselves against the choice of regime itself.9
Asset market equilibrium implies the following relationship between consumption, asset
prices and expected output levels in the two countries
C
C∗
=
qH
qF
Q =
E
h
y
y+y∗
i
E
h
y∗
y+y∗
iQ (11)
The derivation of this expression is outlined in the Appendix. Notice that the real exchange
rate, Q, enters this expression. Fluctuations inQ in the LCP case reflect ineﬃcient deviations
from the law of one price. These cause deviations from eﬃcient consumption risk sharing.
2.4 Money Demand and Supply
Optimal choice of money holdings implies
M/P = χC (12)
The monetary authorities in each country set monetary policy in terms of the relevant
national money supply. The money supply in the foreign country is assumed to be stochastic
such that logM∗ is symmetrically distributed over the interval [−, ] with E[logM∗] = 0
and V ar[logM∗] = σ2. These shocks may represent monetary policy errors on the part
of the foreign monetary authority, or they may be interpreted as disturbances to foreign
money demand, or as financial innovation shocks, which are not fully accommodated by
money supply changes. The presence of such shocks clearly implies that the foreign central
bank is not following an optimal monetary policy. Thus, the first-best policy, in terms of
world aggregate welfare, would be a policy rule for the foreign central bank which entirely
eliminates the monetary disturbances. However, the objective of the present paper is to
analyse the home country monetary policy response when the global first-best policy rule is
not being implemented by the foreign central bank. Thus, for the purposes of this exercise,
the policy of the foreign central bank is taken to be a fixed and exogenous feature of the
world economy.
We define home monetary policy in terms of a feedback rule of the following form
M = M¯
¡
M∗/M¯∗
¢δ
(13)
9See Senay and Sutherland (2007b) for a detailed discussion of the implications of the timing of asset
trade for optimal monetary policy.
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The value of the policy feedback parameter, δ, diﬀers depending on the monetary regime
under consideration. Four diﬀerent regimes are considered: a fixed nominal exchange rate;
money targeting; price targeting; and a welfare maximising monetary rule. In the fixed
exchange rate regime, δ is chosen so that the exchange rate is maintained at a target level,
S¯. In the money targeting regime, δ is set to zero so that the home money supply is constant
at M¯ . In the price targeting regime, δ is determined so that the virtual (or ‘notional’)
producer-price level, P VH , is maintained at a target level, P¯
V
H . And finally, optimal policy
is defined to be the choice of δ which maximises home aggregate utility. The values of δ
implied by each regime are stated below.10
3 Welfare
Aggregate welfare of home agents is measured using the following11
Ω = E
∙
logC − K
2
(Y 2H + Y
∗2
H )
¸
(14)
It is not possible to derive an exact solution to the model described above. A second-
order approximation of the welfare expression is therefore derived. A summary of all the
equations of the model (in both exact and approximated form) is provided in the Appendix.
The Appendix also explains how a second-order accurate solution is obtained.12
A second-order approximation of the welfare measure is given by
Ω˜ = E
n
Cˆ −KY¯ 2H
h
YˆH + Yˆ 2H
i
−KY¯ ∗2H
h
Yˆ ∗H + Yˆ
∗2
H
io
+O
¡
3
¢
(15)
where Ω˜ is the deviation of the level of welfare from the non-stochastic equilibrium. Hence-
forth, a hat over a variable indicates a log deviation from the non-stochastic steady state and
a bar indicates the value in the non-stochastic steady state. Notice that welfare expression
10The target values of M¯, S¯ and P¯VH have no role other than to provide an anchor for nominal variables.
The equilibrium level of nominal variables is irrelevant for aggregate utility and therefore has no implications
for the analysis presented below.
11The utility of real balances is assumed to be small enough to be neglected.
12The approximation is taken around the non-stochastic equilibrium of the model, which is defined as
the solution which results when M∗ = 1 with σ2 = 0. Note that, the only exogenous forcing variable in
the model is the foreign money supply, M∗, so all log-deviations from the non-stochastic equilibrium are of
the same order as the shocks, which (by assumption) are of maximum size . When presenting an equation
which is approximated up to order n it is therefore possible to gather all terms of order higher than n in a
single term denoted O
¡
n+1
¢
.
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(15) includes the first moments of consumption and output and the second moments of out-
put components. Welfare is increasing in the expected level of consumption and decreasing
in the expected level and variance of the components of output. Second-order accurate so-
lutions for variances can be obtained from first-order accurate solutions for the relationships
between endogenous variables and the shock variable. The analysis of volatility therefore
involves working with a log-linearised (i.e. first-order approximated) version of the model.
But a full second-order expression for welfare requires second-order accurate solutions for
both the first and second moments of variables. So, a full analysis of welfare involves working
with a second-order approximation of the model.
In the non-stochastic equilibrium, Y¯H and Y¯ ∗H depend on the monopoly mark-up, φ/(φ−
1). A common practice in the related literature is to introduce a production subsidy to ensure
that outputs are at their welfare maximising level. In all the cases which we will examine
below it is the case that E[YˆH ] + E[Yˆ 2H ] = E[Yˆ
∗
H ] + E[Yˆ
∗2
H ] = 0. The welfare results in this
paper are thus independent of the value of Y¯H and Y¯ ∗H and are therefore independent of the
monopoly distortion and any production subsidy. This also implies that welfare is eﬀectively
determined by E[Cˆ] alone, i.e. Ω˜ = E[Cˆ]. This has the useful implication that welfare, as
measured by Ω˜, can be interpreted directly in terms of log-changes of consumption relative
to its steady state level. Thus, in quantitative terms, 100× Ω˜ can be interpreted as directly
equivalent to a percentage of steady state consumption.
3.1 Welfare and Output Volatility
Before analysing the individual monetary policy rules it is useful to trace and explain the
main linkages between monetary policy and welfare. This will provide a framework to un-
derstand and explain the results presented in the next section. The Appendix shows that
welfare, as defined in equation (15), can be re-written in a particularly simple and intuitive
form. In Cases 1 and 4, where foreign producers are following PCP and the home producers
are following either PCP (Case 1) or LCP (Case 4), welfare can be expressed as follows
Ω˜ =
1
8
E
½
−(5θ − 1)
θ
Yˆ 2H −
(θ − 1)
θ
Yˆ ∗2H
−(3θ + 1)
θ
Yˆ 2F +
(θ − 1)
θ
Yˆ ∗2F + (θ − 1)θSˆ2
¾
+O
¡
3
¢
(16)
while in Cases 2 and 3, where the foreign producers are following LCP and the home pro-
ducers are following either LCP (Case 2) or PCP (Case 3), welfare can be expressed in the
11
form
Ω˜ =
1
8
E
½
−(5θ − 1)
θ
Yˆ 2H −
(θ − 1)
θ
Yˆ ∗2H −
(3θ + 1)
θ
Yˆ 2F +
(θ − 1)
θ
Yˆ ∗2F
¾
+O
¡
3
¢
(17)
Thus welfare can be written as a linear function of the variances of the components of
output in each country, and in the case of equation (16) the variance of the exchange rate.
So, monetary policy aﬀects welfare via its eﬀect on these individual variances.
The impact of monetary policy on the variances of YˆH , YˆF , Yˆ ∗H , Yˆ
∗
F and Sˆ will be described
in more detail below, but first it is useful to understand why these variances aﬀect welfare
in the way shown in (16) and (17). As mentioned above, because E[YˆH ] +E[Yˆ 2H ] = E[Yˆ
∗
H ] +
E[Yˆ ∗2H ] = 0, welfare depends directly (and only) on the expected level of consumption, E[Cˆ],
so to explain (16) and (17) it is necessary first to understand how the variances of YˆH , YˆF ,
Yˆ ∗H , Yˆ
∗
F and Sˆ aﬀect E[Cˆ].
The link between output variances and expected consumption operates via the impact of
output variances on the optimal goods prices set by firms. This is shown most clearly in the
first order conditions for price setting, equations (6) and (7). These equations show that an
important determinant of the optimal price of a good is the variance of the output of that
good. This reflects risk aversion on the part of producers. A higher output variance implies
a higher optimal price. And, by definition, a higher optimal price implies a lower expected
level of demand and thus a lower expected level of output of that good in equilibrium. There
is thus a direct negative relationship between the variances of the output of each good and
the expected level of output of that good, i.e. E[Yˆ 2H ] has a negative eﬀect on E[YˆH ]; E[Yˆ ∗2H ]
has a negative eﬀect on E[Yˆ ∗H ] and so on for the variances and expected levels of YˆF and Yˆ ∗F .
Having explained the link between output variances and expected output levels, it is now
necessary to understand the link between expected output levels and the expected level of
home consumption E[Cˆ] (which is equivalent to home aggregate welfare). The links between
E[YˆH ], E[Yˆ ∗H ], E[YˆF ] and E[Yˆ
∗
F ] and expected consumption, E[Cˆ], depend on three oﬀsetting
eﬀects which vary in strength across the diﬀerent types of good.
The first eﬀect is an aggregate resource eﬀect. An increase in the output of any type of
good increases the aggregate resources available for consumption in the world. The second
eﬀect is a terms of trade eﬀect. An increase in the output of goods produced in the home
country (for either home or foreign consumption) depresses the home terms of trade. The
strength of this eﬀect depends on θ, the international trade elasticity. If θ is greater than
unity, an increase in the output of home goods has a relatively small impact on the terms of
trade, so the relative income of the home country increases. This allows the home country to
expand consumption at the expense of the foreign country. The third eﬀect is a real exchange
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rate eﬀect. An increase in the output of goods consumed by the home country reduces the
relative price of the home consumption basket and thus again allows the home country to
increase consumption at the expense of the foreign country.13
In the case of goods produced in the home country and consumed in the home country,
all three of these eﬀects work in the same direction (at least when θ > 1). So a reduction in
the variance of YˆH raises E[YˆH ] and raises E[Cˆ], hence the negative coeﬃcient on E[Yˆ 2H ] in
(16) and (17). In the case of goods produced in home country and consumed in the foreign
country, the terms of trade and real exchange rate eﬀects work in opposite directions (when
θ > 1). The terms of trade eﬀect, however, appears to dominate, so that a rise in E[Yˆ ∗H ]
increases home income and raises E[Cˆ]. Hence the negative coeﬃcient on E[Yˆ ∗2H ] in (16) and
(17) when θ > 1. In the case of foreign produced goods, the terms of trade and real exchange
rate eﬀects again work in opposite directions (when θ > 1). For foreign produced goods for
home consumption, the net eﬀect implies a negative coeﬃcient on E[Yˆ 2F ] in (16) and (17), i.e.
a rise in E[YˆF ] increases E[Cˆ]. While for foreign produced goods for foreign consumption,
the net eﬀect is a positive coeﬃcient on E[Yˆ ∗2F ] in (16) and (17), i.e. a reduction in E[Yˆ ∗F ]
increases E[Cˆ]. This last eﬀect arises because a reduction in E[Yˆ ∗F ] raises the cost of the
foreign consumption basket and therefore allows home consumption to increase relative to
foreign consumption.14
This completes the explanation of the link between output variances and welfare. Equa-
tion (16), however, shows that, when foreign producers follow PCP, the variance of the
exchange rate also enters the welfare expression. This eﬀect arises from a combination of
a number of small and oﬀsetting eﬀects which have no clear economic interpretation. This
eﬀect is positive when θ > 1. Thus exchange rate volatility appears to have a positive eﬀect
on welfare for θ > 1. But note that exchange rate volatility has an additional indirect eﬀect
on welfare via its impact on the variances of YˆH , YˆF , Yˆ ∗H and Yˆ
∗
F . It is these indirect eﬀects
that dominate the relative performance of the diﬀerent policy regimes analysed below.
13Note that price discrimination between home and foreign markets implies that purchasing power parity
does not hold, even when producers follow PCP. This implies that the real exchange rate eﬀect is present in
all permutations of LCP and PCP.
14Clearly, the sign of the terms of trade eﬀect depends on the value of θ. When θ < 1 an increase in the
volume of output can lead to a fall in the value of home income. This reverses the sign of the coeﬃcients on
E[Yˆ ∗2H ] and E[Yˆ
∗2
F ] in the welfare expressions.
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3.2 Monetary Policy and Output Volatility
The previous sub-section explained welfare in terms of the volatility of YˆH , YˆF , Yˆ ∗H , Yˆ
∗
F and Sˆ.
This explains one part of the link between monetary policy and welfare. It is now necessary
to explain the second part of the link, i.e. the link between home monetary policy and the
volatility of YˆH , YˆF , Yˆ ∗H , Yˆ
∗
F and Sˆ. When considering the impact of monetary policy on
volatility it is suﬃcient to look at first-order accurate solutions to the model.15
A first-order expansion of equation (11) shows that risk sharing implies the following
relationship between realised consumption levels in the two countries: Cˆ − Cˆ∗ = Sˆ + Pˆ ∗ −
Pˆ+O (2). When combined with the expressions for home and foreign money demand (which
imply Mˆ = Pˆ + Cˆ and Mˆ∗ = Pˆ ∗ + Cˆ∗), the following expression for the exchange rate is
obtained
Sˆ = Mˆ − Mˆ∗ +O
¡
2
¢
(18)
Thus the nominal exchange rate depends on relative monetary policy, i.e. the diﬀerence
between the home money supply and the foreign money supply. This is one part of the link
between monetary policy and the volatility of YˆH , YˆF , Yˆ ∗H and Yˆ ∗F .
Using (5) and the corresponding expressions for the foreign country, first-order approxi-
mations for home and foreign aggregate output levels can be written as follows
YˆH = Cˆ − θ(PˆH − Pˆ ) +O
¡
2
¢
, Yˆ ∗H = Cˆ
∗ − θ(Pˆ ∗H − Pˆ ∗) +O
¡
2
¢
(19)
YˆF = Cˆ − θ(PˆF − Pˆ ) +O
¡
2
¢
, Yˆ ∗F = Cˆ
∗ − θ(Pˆ ∗F − Pˆ ∗) +O
¡
2
¢
(20)
These equations show that output levels depend on aggregate consumption in the relevant
country and a relative price term. Making use of first-order approximations of Pˆ and Pˆ ∗
(i.e. (4) and its foreign counterpart) and the expressions for money demand (i.e. (12) and
its foreign counterpart) it is possible to rewrite (19) and (20) as follows
YˆH = Mˆ −
θ + 1
2
PˆH +
θ − 1
2
PˆF +O
¡
2
¢
, Yˆ ∗H = Mˆ
∗− θ + 1
2
Pˆ ∗H +
θ − 1
2
Pˆ ∗F +O
¡
2
¢
(21)
YˆF = Mˆ +
θ − 1
2
PˆH −
θ + 1
2
PˆF +O
¡
2
¢
, Yˆ ∗F = Mˆ
∗+
θ − 1
2
Pˆ ∗H −
θ + 1
2
Pˆ ∗F +O
¡
2
¢
(22)
Furthermore, it follows from the first-order conditions for price setting that PˆH = 0 and
Pˆ ∗F = 0. So
YˆH = Mˆ +
θ − 1
2
PˆF +O
¡
2
¢
, Yˆ ∗H = Mˆ
∗ − θ + 1
2
Pˆ ∗H +O
¡
2
¢
(23)
15Terms of order two and higher in expressions for realised values become terms of order three and higher
in expressions for variances. Higher order terms in expressions for realised values are therefore irrelevant for
the second-order accurate analysis of welfare.
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Case 1 (Home PCP, Foreign PCP)
YˆH = 12(Mˆ + Mˆ
∗) + θ
2
(Mˆ − Mˆ∗)
YˆF = 12(Mˆ + Mˆ
∗)− θ
2
(Mˆ − Mˆ∗)
Yˆ ∗H =
1
2
(Mˆ + Mˆ∗) + θ
2
(Mˆ − Mˆ∗)
Yˆ ∗F =
1
2
(Mˆ + Mˆ∗)− θ
2
(Mˆ − Mˆ∗)
Case 2 (Home LCP, Foreign LCP)
YˆH = Mˆ
YˆF = Mˆ
Yˆ ∗H = Mˆ
∗
Yˆ ∗F = Mˆ
∗
Case 3 (Home PCP, Foreign LCP)
YˆH = Mˆ
YˆF = Mˆ
Yˆ ∗H =
1
2
(Mˆ + Mˆ∗) + θ
2
(Mˆ − Mˆ∗)
Yˆ ∗F =
1
2
(Mˆ + Mˆ∗)− θ
2
(Mˆ − Mˆ∗)
Case 4 (Home LCP, Foreign PCP)
YˆH = 12(Mˆ + Mˆ
∗) + θ
2
(Mˆ − Mˆ∗)
YˆF = 12(Mˆ + Mˆ
∗)− θ
2
(Mˆ − Mˆ∗)
Yˆ ∗H = Mˆ
∗
Yˆ ∗F = Mˆ
∗
Table 1: Output Expressions in Cases 1-4
YˆF = Mˆ −
θ + 1
2
PˆF +O
¡
2
¢
, Yˆ ∗F = Mˆ
∗ +
θ − 1
2
Pˆ ∗H +O
¡
2
¢
(24)
Expressions (23) and (24) show that output levels depend on the money supply and
PˆF (the price of foreign goods in the home market) and Pˆ ∗H (the price of home goods in
the foreign market). The first-order behaviour of Pˆ ∗H and PˆF in turn depend on whether
producers are following PCP or LCP pricing. If home producers are following PCP then
Pˆ ∗H = −Sˆ, while in the LCP case Pˆ ∗H = 0. Likewise if foreign producers are following PCP
then PˆF = Sˆ, while the LCP case implies PˆF = 0. The links between monetary policy and
output therefore depend on the configuration of PCP and LCP across the two countries. The
expressions for output levels are summarised in Table 1. The table shows the expressions
for output levels (after substituting for the exchange rate using Sˆ = Mˆ − Mˆ∗) for the four
permutations of PCP and LCP across the two countries.
The expressions in Table 1 show that monetary policy has potentially two eﬀects on
output levels, one via the impact of home money on the world aggregate money supply,
(Mˆ + Mˆ∗), and one via the impact of home money on relative money supplies, (Mˆ − Mˆ∗).
The first eﬀect arises because, for given price levels, monetary policy aﬀects home and foreign
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aggregate consumption, C and C∗, directly via money market equilibrium. The second eﬀect
arises because monetary policy aﬀects relative goods prices via the nominal exchange rate, S
(as shown in (18)). But the magnitude of this second eﬀect depends on the degree of exchange
rate pass-through, and thus diﬀers in the PCP and LCP cases. The relative price eﬀect also
depends on the international trade elasticity, θ. The relative importance of (Mˆ + Mˆ∗) and
(Mˆ − Mˆ∗) in YˆH , YˆF , Yˆ ∗H and Yˆ ∗F thus depends jointly on the value of θ and the form of
price setting. The larger the value of θ (i.e. the stronger the expenditure switching eﬀect)
the more important is volatility in S and thus the more important is (Mˆ − Mˆ∗). But this
eﬀect only arises in the PCP case. In the LCP case, there is no pass-through from exchange
rate changes to prices.
Given exogenous shocks to M∗, a policy which stabilises (Mˆ + Mˆ∗) will necessarily
destabilise (Mˆ − Mˆ∗) and vice versa. The home monetary authority therefore faces a trade-
oﬀ between stabilising (Mˆ + Mˆ∗) and (Mˆ − Mˆ∗). The terms of this trade-oﬀ will depend
on the form of price setting, PCP versus LCP, and on the value of θ. The balance between
these diﬀerent eﬀects clearly has important implications for the relative welfare performance
of the diﬀerent policy regimes. This will become clear as the results are described for the
four diﬀerent permutations of LCP and PCP in Cases 1 to 4.
4 Results
The results are now presented for the four cases outlined in the introduction. In Case 1 both
home and foreign producers follow PCP.16 In Case 2 both home and foreign producers follow
LCP. Cases 3 and 4 are asymmetric. In Case 3 home producers follow PCP and foreign
producers follow LCP. And in Case 4 home producers follow LCP and foreign producers
follow PCP.
4.1 Case 1: Home and Foreign Producers Follow PCP
Table 2 presents a comparison between the four monetary policy regimes when both home
and foreign producers follow PCP. These results are also illustrated in Figures 1, 2 and 3
where δ (the policy feedback parameter), Ω˜ (welfare) and the standard deviation of Sˆ are
plotted for the four policy regimes for a range of values of θ.17 The results shown in Table 2
16A detailed analysis of Case 1 is presented in Senay and Sutherland (2007a).
17For the purpose of illustration these figures, and all subsequent figures, are based on σ = 0.1. The vertical
axis in Figure 2 plots welfare in terms of 100× Ω˜. This quantity can be interpreted as a percentage of steady
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8
£
θ2 − θ + 4
¤
σ2 −
¡
θ+1
θ+3
¢
σ2 −
³
θ2+4θ−1
2θ(θ+3)
´
σ2
E
h
Sˆ2
i
0 σ2
¡
4
θ+3
¢2 σ2 ³2(θ+1)θ(θ+3)´2 σ2
Table 2: Policy feedback parameter, welfare and exchange rate volatility in Case 1
and Figures 1, 2 and 3 correspond to the results presented in our previous analysis (Senay
and Sutherland, 2007a).18
First consider a comparison between money targeting and a fixed nominal exchange rate.
In terms of the policy rule (13), monetary targeting clearly implies δ = 0, while equation
(18) shows that a fixed nominal exchange rate requires δ = 1. The welfare comparison
in Table 2 and Figure 2 shows that, for low values of θ money targeting delivers higher
welfare than a fixed rate, while the opposite is the case for higher values of θ. This can be
easily understood by considering the welfare function in (16) and the expressions for the
components of output given in Table 1. The main determinants of welfare are the variances
of YˆH and Yˆ ∗H . The expressions in Table 1 show that in Case 1 the variances of both YˆH and
Yˆ ∗H are heavily influenced by the trade-oﬀ between aggregate money, (Mˆ +Mˆ∗), and relative
money, (Mˆ − Mˆ∗).
Relative monetary policy, (Mˆ − Mˆ∗), clearly becomes more important as θ increases, i.e.
as the international trade elasticity rises. Money targeting is good for stabilising (Mˆ + Mˆ∗),
while a fixed rate is good for stabilising (Mˆ−Mˆ∗). Thus money targeting is the better policy
when (Mˆ − Mˆ∗) is relatively less important for output determination, i.e. when θ is low,
while a fixed rate is better when (Mˆ − Mˆ∗) is relatively more important, i.e. when θ is high.
Now consider the welfare performance of price targeting (defined in terms of targeting
P VH ). For θ > 1, Table 2 shows that price targeting implies a value of δ between zero and
unity. Thus price targeting can be regarded as a compromise between monetary targeting
state consumption. Subsequent welfare plots can also be interpreted in these terms.
18There are minor diﬀerences compared to Senay and Sutherland (2007a) because our previous analysis
was based on a model where utility was not additively separable in YˆH and Yˆ ∗H . These small diﬀerences do
not change the qualitative nature of the results.
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and a fixed rate. Figure 2 shows that price targeting delivers higher welfare than both a fixed
rate and money targeting for all values of θ. This higher welfare performance arises because
price targeting oﬀers a compromise between stabilising (Mˆ +Mˆ∗) and stabilising (Mˆ−Mˆ∗).
Price targeting is thus more successful at stabilising home output than either a fixed rate
or money targeting. Notice that, as θ rises, so that exchange rate volatility becomes more
important in determining output volatility, price targeting tends to imply more exchange
rate stabilisation.
While price targeting is a good compromise between a fixed rate and money targeting,
Table 2 shows that price targeting is not equivalent to the fully optimal policy. The fully
optimal policy rule is given by choosing the value of δ to maximise home welfare. The implied
optimal value of δ is shown in Table 2. For θ > 1 it is clear that this value of δ is again
between zero and unity, so optimal policy is a compromise between a fixed rate and money
targeting. Figure 3 shows that price targeting is a reasonably good approximation for optimal
policy, but optimal policy (for θ > 1) implies slightly more exchange rate stabilisation than
price targeting.19
A useful point of comparison in the existing literature is the analysis of Benigno and Be-
nigno (2003) who show that price targeting is the optimal coordinated and Nash equilibrium
policy in a two-country model with PCP and shocks to productivity. Benigno and Benigno
(2003) assume a unit elasticity between home and foreign goods (θ = 1), but the optimality
of price targeting in a coordinated equilibrium continues to hold in their framework for θ
diﬀerent from unity. This contrasts with our finding that price targeting is not fully optimal
in the face of foreign monetary shocks when θ diﬀers from unity.
4.2 Case 2: Home and Foreign Producers Follow LCP
Now consider Case 2, where both home and foreign producers follow LCP. Table 3 presents
a comparison between the four monetary regimes for Case 2.
It is immediately clear that monetary targeting, price targeting and optimal policy are
all identical in this case. They all imply δ = 0 and they all deliver higher welfare than a fixed
nominal exchange rate. The explanation for this ranking of regimes is simple to understand
in terms of the output equations in Table 1 and the welfare expression (17). These equations
19Notice that when θ < 1 optimal policy implies higher exchange rate volatility than the other regimes.
As previously explained, when θ < 1, an increase in home output reduces home income. This reverses the
welfare impact of exchange rate volatility. When θ < 1, higher exchange rate volatility reduces home output
and increases home income.
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show that YˆH and YˆF depend only on Mˆ and that Yˆ ∗H and Yˆ
∗
F depend only on Mˆ
∗. Home
monetary policy has no impact on Yˆ ∗H and Yˆ
∗
F so there is no scope for monetary policy to
stabilise these components of output. The only role for home monetary policy is thus to
stabilise YˆH and YˆF and this can be achieved by a completely passive monetary regime, i.e.
monetary targeting. This policy also completely stabilises Pˆ+Cˆ and thus (given stabilisation
of YˆH) delivers perfect stabilisation of Pˆ VH , as required by price targeting.
A fixed rate regime, however, is clearly sub-optimal because it requires home monetary
policy to match the foreign money shocks. This causes unnecessary, and welfare reducing,
volatility in YˆH and YˆF .
The underlying reason for the contrast with Case 1 is the complete absence of the expen-
diture switching eﬀect of exchange rate changes when both home and foreign producers follow
LCP. Symmetric LCP implies that exchange rate changes have no impact on the relative
prices faced by consumers in the short run. Nominal exchange rate volatility is therefore
irrelevant for output determination and welfare. The incentive to stabilise the exchange
rate is correspondingly reduced. An obvious corollary of this is that the international trade
elasticity, θ, is irrelevant to the welfare comparison between policy regimes.
Notice that the presence of LCP in this model has an eﬀect which is exactly opposite to
that in the Devereux and Engel (2003) analysis, where LCP creates an incentive for exchange
rate stabilisation. In the Devereux and Engel (2003) model the impact of exchange rate
volatility on consumption risk sharing is strong enough on its own to make a fixed rate
optimal. This eﬀect does not arise in the model analysed here because a fixed exchange
rate transfers consumption risk from the foreign country to the home country. This may be
welfare improving for the foreign country and even may be welfare improving for the world
as a whole (measured in terms of the aggregate of home and foreign utility) but it is not
welfare improving for the home country.
4.3 Case 3: Home Producers Follow PCP, Foreign Producers Fol-
low LCP
Table 4 and Figures 4, 5 and 6 present a comparison between the four monetary policy
regimes in Case 3, where home producers follow PCP and foreign producers follow LCP.
This corresponds to a world where the home currency is an international reference currency,
while monetary shocks are occurring in a non-reference currency. So the home country can be
thought of as the USA, for instance, while monetary shocks may be thought of as occurring
outside the USA.
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Fixed rate Money targeting Price targeting Optimal policy
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Table 3: Policy feedback parameter, welfare and exchange rate volatility in Case 2
Fixed rate Money targeting Price targeting Optimal policy
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Table 4: Policy feedback parameter, welfare and exchange rate volatility in Case 3
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Table 4 shows that, again, money targeting, price targeting and optimal policy are all
identical. In all these cases the value of δ is zero. As in Case 2, these regimes yield higher
welfare than a fixed exchange rate.
This ranking of policy regimes is again easily explained with reference to the output
expressions given in Table 1 and the welfare expression (17). In Case 3 these expressions
show that YˆH and YˆF depend only on Mˆ. YˆH and YˆF are the outputs of goods which the home
country consumes so, as discussed in Section 3.1, the variances of YˆH and YˆF are particularly
significant in the determination of home welfare. Clearly, therefore, the stabilisation of YˆH
and YˆF has strong welfare benefits. This has a close parallel to the results just discussed for
Case 2. However, unlike Case 2, Yˆ ∗H and Yˆ
∗
F are not independent of home monetary policy.
Nevertheless, the variances of Yˆ ∗H and Yˆ
∗
F have equal and opposite eﬀects on home welfare
(as shown in equation (17)) so stabilisation of these outputs has no net welfare benefit to the
home economy. It is therefore optimal for the home country to adopt money targeting. As in
Case 2, money targeting and price targeting are equivalent because Pˆ VH = YˆH+ Pˆ +Cˆ = 2Mˆ.
The underlying explanation for these results is the following. When foreign producers
follow LCP, home country consumers face prices which are fixed in the home currency and
are therefore insulated from changes in the nominal exchange rate. There is therefore no
expenditure switching eﬀect for home consumption goods. Exchange rate volatility is thus
unimportant for home consumption goods. There is, however, an expenditure switching
eﬀect for foreign consumption goods, but volatility in the output of foreign consumption
goods has no net impact on home welfare, so exchange rate volatility is irrelevant for the
home economy.20
4.4 Case 4: Home Producers Follow LCP, Foreign Producers Fol-
low PCP
Case 2 and Case 3 both show a complete contrast to the results emphasised in Case 1. In
both Case 2 and Case 3 a fixed exchange rate is the lowest ranked regime in terms of welfare.
In both cases the expenditure switching eﬀect, and thus exchange rate volatility, is largely
(or completely) irrelevant for home country monetary policy. A policy of money targeting,
20There is a clear parallel between this result and a result obtained by Devereux et al (2007). Devereux et
al analyse a model of a reference currency and find that the country with the reference currency is indiﬀerent
to exchange rate volatility while the non-reference country places a high welfare weight on exchange rate
volatility. As with most of the LCP literature, Devereux et al focus on the implications of productivity
shocks. Furthermore, unlike this paper, they do not compare monetary policy regimes. Instead they focus
on a Nash equilibrium in the choice of monetary rules.
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Table 5: Policy feedback parameter, welfare and exchange rate volatility in Case 4
or equivalently price targeting, is optimal, regardless of the value of the international trade
elasticity, θ. Clearly, the crucial feature of both cases is that foreign producers are following
LCP. This is suﬃcient to insulate the home country from the exchange rate volatility caused
by foreign money shocks and its welfare reducing eﬀects.
Now consider Case 4, where home producers follow LCP and foreign producers follow
PCP. In this case it is the foreign currency which can be regarded as the reference currency
(such as the US dollar) while the home currency is a non-reference currency. The results
for this case are given in Table 5 and illustrated in Figures 7, 8 and 9. These results show,
in contrast to Cases 2 and 3, that exchange rate volatility is now very important for home
welfare and home monetary policy. The assumption of PCP in the foreign country is clearly
suﬃcient to expose the home country to the eﬀects of foreign money shocks.
To understand these points in more detail first consider a comparison between money
targeting and a fixed nominal exchange rate. As before, money targeting implies δ = 0 and
a fixed rate requires δ = 1. Table 5 and Figure 8 show that, as in Case 1, money targeting
yields higher welfare when θ is relatively low, while a fixed rate yields higher welfare for
larger values of θ. The output equations in Table 1 and the welfare expression (16) show
that the underlying explanation for this results is the same as that given in Case 1. The
home monetary authority, in attempting to stabilise YˆH and YˆF , faces a trade-oﬀ between
stabilising (Mˆ + Mˆ∗) and (Mˆ − Mˆ∗). Money targeting yields a lower volatility of (Mˆ + Mˆ∗)
at the expense of higher volatility of (Mˆ − Mˆ∗). This yields lower volatility of YˆH and
YˆF (compared to a fixed exchange rate) when θ is relatively low. A fixed exchange rate
completely stabilises (Mˆ − Mˆ∗) at the expense of higher volatility of (Mˆ + Mˆ∗). This yields
lower volatility of YˆH and YˆF (compared to money targeting) when θ is relatively high.
As in Case 1, price targeting oﬀers a compromise between the fixed rate and money
22
targeting regimes (when θ > 1) in the sense that δ lies between zero and unity. Price
targeting therefore implies more exchange rate volatility than a fixed rate, but less exchange
rate volatility than money targeting (for θ > 1). Notice, however, that, unlike in Case 1,
price targeting is not welfare superior to a fixed rate for all values of θ. In fact, for values
of θ greater than approximately 3.8 a fixed rate yields higher welfare than price targeting.21
This is an important diﬀerence between Case 4 and Case 1 (where price targeting is always
welfare superior to a fixed rate).
To understand this contrast between the performance of price targeting in Case 1 and
Case 4 it is necessary to consider the impact of monetary policy on the volatility of Yˆ ∗H and
Yˆ ∗F and the impact of these volatilities on home welfare. Yˆ
∗
H and Yˆ
∗
F are exogenous in Case
4 and thus have no implications for the comparison between policy regimes in that case.
But in Case 1 home monetary policy can aﬀect Yˆ ∗H and Yˆ ∗F , so the diﬀerence between the
performance of price targeting in Cases 1 and 4 must be related to these variables.
Notice from the welfare expression (16) that the variances of Yˆ ∗H and Yˆ
∗
F have equal
and opposite eﬀects on home welfare. The variance of Yˆ ∗H has a negative welfare impact,
while the variance of Yˆ ∗F has a positive welfare impact. Home welfare is thus decreasing in
E[Yˆ ∗2H ]−E[Yˆ ∗2F ]. This diﬀerence in Case 4 is clearly zero. But the expressions for Yˆ ∗H and Yˆ ∗F
in Table 1 for Case 1 show that E[Yˆ ∗2H ]−E[Yˆ ∗2F ] = θE[(Mˆ+Mˆ∗)(Mˆ−Mˆ∗)] = θE[Mˆ2−Mˆ∗2].
In Case 1, therefore, this term contributes an extra negative impact of monetary activism
which does not arise in Case 4. In other words, the optimal δ in Case 4 is greater than the
optimal δ in Case 1 (when θ > 1). Optimal policy in Case 4 therefore yields lower exchange
rate volatility than in Case 1. Thus, in Case 4, for large values of θ a fixed exchange rate is
closer to optimal policy than price targeting.
5 Conclusions
This paper analyses the implications of LCP in a two-country model where monetary shocks
arise in the foreign country and the policy question is the choice of appropriate monetary
regime for the home country. In the presence of foreign monetary shocks, the expenditure
switching role of the exchange rate can have a potentially welfare reducing eﬀect because it
transmits the eﬀects of foreign shocks to the home economy. LCP has obvious implications
for the expenditure switching role of the exchange rate and this paper shows how LCP aﬀects
the welfare comparison between policy regimes in the face of foreign monetary shocks.
21Notice again that when θ < 1 optimal policy implies higher exchange rate volatility than the other
regimes. As previously explained, when θ < 1 the welfare impact of exchange rate volatility is reversed.
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The paper considers four possible combinations of PCP and LCP. In the case where
there is complete and symmetric LCP we find that the expenditure switching eﬀect is absent
and exchange rate movements play no part in transmitting foreign monetary shocks to the
home country. This completely removes any incentive for the home country to stabilise the
exchange rate. In this case, floating rate regimes are shown to be welfare superior to a fixed
exchange rate. The conclusions are diﬀerent, however, if LCP is asymmetric. In the case
where home country producers adopt PCP while foreign producers adopt LCP, we find that
the case for exchange rate flexibility is strengthened relative to the symmetric PCP case. But
in the opposite case, where home producers follow LCP and foreign producers follow PCP,
the case for exchange rate stabilisation is strengthened. In fact, in this second asymmetric
case, a fixed rate can out-perform price targeting in welfare terms.
The second asymmetric case corresponds to a world where the foreign currency is an
international reference currency (e.g. the US dollar). So the policy problem can be inter-
preted as the regime choice faced by countries (other than the USA) in a world where trade
is priced in US dollars and where US monetary shocks cause fluctuations in the value of the
dollar. The conclusion is that such countries can benefit by stabilising (or even fixing) the
value of their currency against the dollar. This indeed corresponds to the monetary policy
actually adopted by a wide range of emerging market countries.
The first asymmetric case corresponds to a world where the home currency is a reference
currency, while monetary shocks are occurring in a non-reference currency. The conclusion,
in this case, is that exchange rate flexibility is a useful way for the home country to insulate
itself from foreign monetary shocks.
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Appendix
A: Portfolio Allocation, Asset Prices and Risk Sharing
There are four first-order conditions for the choice of asset holdings. After some rearrange-
ment they imply the following four equations
E
£
C−1y
¤
= E
£
C−1
¤
qH , E
£
C−1y∗
¤
= E
£
C−1
¤
qF (A1)
E
£
C∗−1y
¤
= E
£
C∗−1
¤
qH , E
£
C∗−1y∗
¤
= E
£
C∗−1
¤
qF (A2)
Using the solution procedure outlined in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996, pp. 302-3) it is possible
to show that consumption levels in the two countries are given by
C =
qH [y + y∗]
qH + qF
Q, C∗ =
qF [y + y∗]
qH + qF
and the two asset prices are given by
qH =
E
h
y
y+y∗
i
E
h
1
y+y∗
i , qF = E
h
y∗
y+y∗
i
E
h
1
y+y∗
i (A3)
which implies
C
C∗
=
qH
qF
Q =
E
h
y
y+y∗
i
E
h
y∗
y+y∗
iQ (A4)
which is equation (11) in the main text.
B: Model solution
The equations of the model are summarised in Table 6. The equations in their exact form
are shown in the first column and the second-order approximations are shown in the second
column. The second-order terms from the approximate form of the equations are summarised
in Table 7. Note that the first-order approximation of the model can be obtained from the
equations in the second column of Table 6 by setting all the second-order terms equal to
zero. Note also that, to a first-order approximation, all expected values are zero. The set
of equations varies depending on the configuration of LCP and PCP in the two countries.
In Case 1, where both home and foreign producers follow PCP, the relevant set of equations
is (B1) to (B16) with second-order terms given by (B19) to (B26) in Table 7. In Case 2,
where both home and foreign producers follow LCP, the relevant set of equations is (B1) to
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Exact Equation 2nd Order Approximation
P =
£
1
2
P 1−θH +
1
2
P 1−θF
¤ 1
1−θ Pˆ = 1
2
PˆH + 12PˆF + λP (B1)
P ∗ =
£
1
2
P ∗1−θH +
1
2
P ∗1−θF
¤ 1
1−θ Pˆ ∗ = 1
2
Pˆ ∗H +
1
2
Pˆ ∗F + λP∗ (B2)
YH = 12C
¡PH
P
¢−θ YˆH = Cˆ − θ ³PˆH − Pˆ´ (B3)
YF = 12C
¡PF
P
¢−θ YˆF = Cˆ − θ ³PˆF − Pˆ´ (B4)
Y ∗H =
1
2
C∗
³
P∗H
P∗
´−θ
Yˆ ∗H = Cˆ
∗ − θ
³
Pˆ ∗H − Pˆ ∗
´
(B5)
Y ∗F =
1
2
C∗
³
P ∗F
P ∗
´−θ
Yˆ ∗F = Cˆ∗ − θ
³
Pˆ ∗F − Pˆ ∗
´
(B6)
y = (YHPH/S + Y ∗HP
∗
H)/P
∗ yˆ = 1
2
(YˆH + PˆH − Sˆ) + 12(Yˆ ∗H + Pˆ ∗H)− Pˆ ∗ + λy (B7)
y∗ = (YFPF/S + Y ∗FP
∗
F/)/P
∗ yˆ∗ = 1
2
(YˆF + PˆF − Sˆ) + 12(Yˆ ∗F + Pˆ ∗F )− Pˆ ∗ + λy∗ (B8)
C
C∗ =
E[ yy+y∗ ]
E[ y
∗
y+y∗ ]
SP∗
P Cˆ − Cˆ∗ = E [yˆ]−E[yˆ∗] + Sˆ + Pˆ ∗ − Pˆ (B9)
M/P = χC Mˆ − Pˆ = Cˆ (B10)
M∗/P ∗ = χC∗ Mˆ∗ − Pˆ ∗ = Cˆ∗ (B11)
M = M¯
¡
M∗/M¯∗
¢δ Mˆ = δMˆ∗ (B12)
PH = φφ−1
KE[Y 2H]
E[YH/(PC)]
PˆH = E[YˆH + Pˆ + Cˆ] + λPH + ξPH (B13)
P ∗F =
φ
φ−1
KE[Y ∗2F ]
E[Y ∗F /(P∗C∗)]
Pˆ ∗F = E[Yˆ
∗
F + Pˆ
∗ + Cˆ∗] + λP∗F + ξP∗F (B14)
P ∗H =
φ
φ−1
KE[Y ∗2H ]
E[Y ∗H/(PC)]S
Pˆ ∗H = E[Yˆ ∗H + Pˆ + Cˆ]− Sˆ + λP∗H + ξP∗H (B15)
PF = φφ−1
KE[Y 2F ]S
E[YF /(P∗C∗)]
PˆF = E[YˆF + Pˆ ∗ + Cˆ∗] + Sˆ + λPF + ξPF (B16)
P ∗H =
φ
φ−1
KE[Y ∗2H ]
E[SY ∗H/(PC)]
Pˆ ∗H = E[Yˆ
∗
H + Pˆ + Cˆ − Sˆ] + λP∗H + ξP∗H (B17)
PF = φφ−1
KE[Y 2F ]
E[YF /(SP∗C∗)]
PˆF = E[YˆF + Pˆ ∗ + Cˆ∗ + Sˆ] + λPF + ξPF (B18)
Table 6: Equations of the model
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λP = 18(1− θ)(PˆH − PˆF )2 (B19)
λP∗ = 18(1− θ)(Pˆ ∗H − Pˆ ∗F )2 (B20)
λy = 12(YˆH + PˆH − Sˆ − Yˆ ∗H − Pˆ ∗H)2 (B21)
λy∗ = 12(YˆF + PˆF − Sˆ − Yˆ ∗F − Pˆ ∗F )2 (B22)
λPH = 2E[Yˆ
2
H ], ξPH = −
1
2
E[(YˆH − Pˆ − Cˆ)2] (B23)
λP∗F = 2E[Yˆ
∗2
F ], ξP ∗F = −
1
2
E[(Yˆ ∗F − Pˆ ∗ − Cˆ∗)2] (B24)
λP∗H = 2E[Yˆ
∗2
H ], ξP∗H = −
1
2
E[(Yˆ ∗H − Pˆ − Cˆ)2] (B25)
λPF = 2E[Yˆ
2
F ], ξPF = −
1
2
E[(YˆF − Pˆ ∗ − Cˆ∗)2] (B26)
λP∗H = 2E[Yˆ
∗2
H ], ξP∗H = −
1
2
E[(Yˆ ∗H + Sˆ − Pˆ − Cˆ)2] (B27)
λPF = 2E[Yˆ
2
F ], ξPF = −
1
2
E[(YˆF − Sˆ − Pˆ ∗ − Cˆ∗)2] (B28)
Table 7: Second-order terms
(B14) and (B17) and (B18) with second order terms (B19) to (B24) and (B27) and (B28).
In Case 3, where home producers follow PCP and foreign producers follow LCP, the relevant
set of equations is (B1) to (B15) and (B18) with second order terms (B19) to (B25) and
(B28). And in Case 4, where home producers follow LCP and foreign producers follow PCP,
the relevant set of equations is (B1) to (B14) and (B16) and (B17) with second order terms
(B19) to (B24) and (B26) and (B27). In each of the four cases the set of equations solves
for the equilibrium values of vector V where
V =
h
Pˆ Pˆ ∗ YˆH YˆF Yˆ ∗H Yˆ
∗
F yˆ yˆ
∗ Sˆ Cˆ Cˆ∗ Mˆ PˆH PˆF Pˆ ∗H Pˆ
∗
F
i
To solve for welfare it is necessary to obtain a second-order accurate expression for E[Cˆ].
It is useful to do this in two stages. In the first stage it is possible to solve for E[Cˆ] in terms
of the second-order terms λP , λP∗ etc. to yield the following expression
E[Cˆ] =
1
2
E
∙
1− 5θ
8θ
λPH +
1− θ
8θ
λP∗H −
1 + 3θ
8θ
λPF −
1− θ
8θ
λP∗F
+
1− 5θ
8θ
ξPH +
1− θ
8θ
ξP∗H −
1 + 3θ
8θ
ξPF −
1− θ
8θ
ξP∗F
−(1 + θ)λP +
1 + θ
4θ
λy −
1 + θ
4θ
λy∗
¸
This expression is identical for all permutations of LCP and PCP across the two countries.
In the second stage it is necessary to substitute for the second-order terms using the
expressions in Table 7. The resulting expression for E[Cˆ] can be further simplified by
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evaluating second-order terms using first-order accurate expressions for realised values. As
previously noted, the first-order approximation for the model is obtained from the first-order
parts of the equations listed in column 2 of Table 6. By this means, it is possible to show in
Cases 1 and 4 that
E
"
1−5θ
8θ ξPH +
1−θ
8θ ξP∗H −
1+3θ
8θ ξPF −
1−θ
8θ ξP∗F
−(1 + θ)λP + 1+θ4θ λy −
1+θ
4θ λy∗
#
=
1
8
(θ − 1)θE[Sˆ2] (B29)
and thus
E[Cˆ] =
1
8
E
½
−(5θ − 1)
θ
Yˆ 2H −
(θ − 1)
θ
Yˆ ∗2H
−(3θ + 1)
θ
Yˆ 2F +
(θ − 1)
θ
Yˆ ∗2F + (θ − 1)θSˆ2
¾
+O
¡
3
¢
(B30)
which is the welfare expression given in (16) in the main text. While in Cases 2 and 3 it can
be shown that
E
"
1−5θ
8θ ξPH +
1−θ
8θ ξP∗H −
1+3θ
8θ ξPF −
1−θ
8θ ξP∗F
−(1 + θ)λP + 1+θ4θ λy −
1+θ
4θ λy∗
#
= 0 (B31)
and thus
E[Cˆ] =
1
8
E
½
−(5θ − 1)
θ
Yˆ 2H −
(θ − 1)
θ
Yˆ ∗2H
−(3θ + 1)
θ
Yˆ 2F +
(θ − 1)
θ
Yˆ ∗2F
¾
+O
¡
3
¢
(B32)
which is the welfare expression given in (17) in the main text.
A similar two-stage solution procedure can be used to show that E[YˆH ] + E[Yˆ 2H ] =
E[Yˆ ∗H ] +E[Yˆ
∗2
H ] = 0. This confirms that Ω˜ = E[Cˆ].
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